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THE
C A S E
Of a Standing
ARMY
Freely and Impartially
S T A T E D, &c.

1850
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Y V O

1850

THE
C A S E

Of a Standing Army

A R M Y

Fairly and Impartially

S T A T E D .

I N

A N S W E R

To the late History of

S T A N D I N G A R M I E S .

I N

E N G L A N D :

And other Pamphlets writ on that Subject.

THE
P R E F A C E.

I Cannot but with Grief behold, how active some persons have been of late, in contriving ways to divide us into Parties and Factions. 'Tis wonderful to imagine how many Arts and Stratagems they daily make use of to promote their Ill Designs. In the War time they were continually bellowing, the French wou'd be too hard for us, and spin out the War, till we were ruin'd by the expence of it; and that, talk what we wou'd, it was impossible we shou'd ever bring our Potent Enemy to terms of Agreement, either safe or Honourable. This was their Trick they us'd then, to compass the Nation's Ruin, by discouraging the People from assisting with their Purses, the endeavours of his Majesty; but God be thanked, the Wisdom of our Parliaments, and the Love the People bore his Majesty, caus'd us chearfully to carry on the War, to the wonder of our Enemies both at home and abroad, and Confusion of all their dev'lish Designs.

And now, that we have bravely gain'd an Honourable Peace; they as Industriously wrack their wicked Inventions, to find means to rob us of the benefits we might hope from it, and render it ineffectual, by setting us in Flames at home, and embroiling us into Fatal Fewsds, and Discontents; that if possible our Foreign Enemies may be oblig'd to them for what they were never able to do themselves,

A

The PREFACE.

selves, and be forc'd for once to own, English Wits have been sharper than French Swords. To this end they shift Sails, and tell us, the French are weak and Impotent, and unable to attempt any thing against us, that consequently a Standing Army is unnecessary, and a needless expence; and least the People shou'd not regard that, they fright them with Dangers, and Chimerical Bugbears. And seeing these Men's designs have, in both these changes, evidently endeavour'd the Interest of our Foreign Enemies; It is not at all absurd to imagine they have had the handling of a few Lewidores, and then we need no longer wonder at their Actions; for that Mettal carries a great weight with it; and has a way of perswading, which their corrupted Consciences is no wise able to resist; Nay least we shou'd believe they cou'd, this Author has given us two Instances to the contrary; in hopes perhaps of reviving here the Trade of Bribery, which to their unspeakable Grief has been Dead so long.

This I believe, will afford us the true cause of their complaining of the splitting and Multiplying of Places, as he calls it; for indeed if any sober man considers it; he can't but think it more safe; and that the Trust is likelier to be manag'd with more Integrity in the hands of many, than one; for they are as a Guard or Watch upon one another: If there be but one honest man in Five, Seven, or Nine, his example will oblige the rest to be so too, least they are found fault with; whereas there is not that obligation on a single Person; But if there is not an honest man to be found in Five, Seven, or Nine; we are in a hopeless state, and our Affairs in a desperate Condition.

If these Gentlemen were scatter'd among those places one among the Five, another among the Seven, another a

The PREFACE.

mong the Nine, &c. then I suppose, 'twou'd be full as well, as if the Commissions were entrusted with single Persons; (themselves expected) and the places wou'd be well mannag'd to be sure, tho' there were Ninety Nine joy'n'd with them; so that 'tis plain their Quarrel do's not lye against the Splitting of Offices; but they are angry that none of the splinters fell to their share: They think they have as much capacity, and therefore as good pretensions to preferment as any one. This is the ground of their Quarrels, and true reason of all their Complaints, and as we deal with peevish froward Children, the readiest way to quiet them is to give them something to Play with.

In the following Pages I have endeavour'd to shew the Necessity of a Standing Force, not as they do, by what was formerly in Use; but by considering the Present Circumstances of things, which is the only true way of obtaining the right; for 'tis not what our Ancestors did formerly, but what we ought to do now.

Our Ancestors acted according to the state of their Affairs, and I dare affirm, if they were living now, they wou'd alter their Measures, to the present occasions, and make no scruple of varying their Counsels as they saw necessity requir'd.

Such a Method of acting is a sure sign of Wisdom, and seldom fail of success; whereas never to alter, tho' there's Necessity for it, shews Positiveness in the highest degree; proves incurable folly, and ever ends in unpitied Misery.

These Gentlemen, wise in their own Conceits, are always instructing others; they have not patience to let the Wisdom of the Nation act as they shall think fit; but by an impud. n' boldness they pretend to Model the Government, and regulate the Affairs of the Nation in a Club

The P R E F A C E.

Room, over a heap of Sot's Weed, with as much assurance as if they were all Privy Counsellors, and are as Dogmatical and Positive in what they advance, as if they had chous'd the Pope of his Infallibility.

They might have been so Civil as to have stay'd, to see what His Majesty's thoughts were, and what the Parliament will do in the business; since all good Men are assur'd, that His Majesty will never intend, nor the Parliament ever consent, to any thing, but what will be evidently for the Glory, Honour, and Safety of these Nations.

THE

THE
C A S E
Of a Standing
ARMY
Freely and Impartially
S T A T E D, &c.

TIS not at all strange to see the best things
Evil spoken of. The Wisest Counsels and
most Regular Conduct have often been
severely Censur'd even by those who
have largely shar'd their good Effects. There have
been some in all Ages, who have had such a pre-
dominant and unhappy mixture of Ill-nature in their
Constitutions, that they have taken a pleasure to
A be

be always out of Humour, ever complaining and murmuring, never pleas'd with either good or bad Fortune ; and since the whole delight of such wretches consists in a constant exercise of their Spleen, they take care never to want this dev'lish diversion, by continually employing themselves in finding faults in others ; not putting themselves to the trouble of distinguishing between *Good*, and *Ill*, unless it be to bestow their bitterest Reproaches where they find the greatest Excellencies, because most directly opposite to their own Imperfections.

That this is the case of most of our *Malecontents* I believe we may be pretty sure ; for it can easily be shewn, that the very *same* Persons have been noted *Grumbletonians* in the Luxurious and Effeminate Reign of *Charles* the II. the Arbitrary and Tyrannical Reign of the late King *James*, and still keep up their Inarling Humours even in the Mild and Easie one of his present Majesty King *William* : So that 'tis plain the fault lies only in their own corrupted Blood and vicious Tempers.

That such People shou'd have any regard, or that any one shou'd be drawn in to mind or value, much less to cry up, their wicked Insinuations and mischeivous Complaints, which have no other source than the too great abundance of their Spleen, and their own settled ill dispositions, which no Art can correct or cure, is a very surprizing and sad Accident, and ought to be dreaded by every good person ; for in the end the Consequences may prove very fatal and prejudicial.

Amongst

Amongst these sort of Men none have made a greater Noise or seem'd to have more plausible pretences, than those Persons who have employ'd their Pens in terrifying the People with the danger of a Standing Army. *Liberty* is their Cry, a Glorious Topick indeed when it is not abus'd; but it has ever been made the Stalking-Horse to all Designs, and dress'd up in as various shapes as the Witt and Cunning of Designing Persons found necessary and convenient to their Ends and Purposes; 'tis an Argument very specious and plausible, never failing to dazzle the Eyes of the Unthinking Vulgar, who run away with the word, and consider no farther than the bare out-side of things.

Whether or no there lies any ill Designs, at the bottom of the present clamour against a Standing Army, I know not; but I am afraid of what might follow if these Gentlemens Notions were embrac'd, and their desires satisfyed; I cannot but think we shou'd be in very ill Circumstances if we were left Unguarded, and without Forces sufficient to secure us from the Insults of our Enemies; but I hope their ill counsels will never prevail to reduce us to so lamentable a condition, as to be more beholden to the Generosity or Imprudence of an Enemy, than to our own Strength and Wisdom.

Nay I dare engage, that these same Gentlemen, who are now so very hot for the Disbanding the Army, shou'd the Army be Disbanded, wou'd be so far from being better satisfied, or cur'd of the

spleenetick Humours they are overrun with, that they wou'd then make the *Want* of an Army the Grounds and Occasions of new Complaints; they wou'd then with open Mouths, and a full Cry, and with something more reason on their side, roar out, that we were neither safe nor secure, but left naked and defenceless to a Potent and Inveterate Enemy, who might, (if he pleas'd) make an easie Conquest of us, and quickly be Master both of our Lives and Estates; This wou'd then be the Outcry, and we shou'd be Impos'd on with the continual Alarms of an Invasion from abroad, by the very *same* Persons, who now endeavour to frighten us with the Loss of our Freedom and Liberties by an Army at home; the grumbling Humor wou'd still find something to feed on, and preserve it self alive in spite of either Cure or Poison.

But to begin with our Author of the *History of Standing Armies in England*; Page first he says, *If any Man doubts whether a standing Army is Slavery, Popery, Mahometism, Paganism, Atheism, or any thing which they please.* How Sir, A Standing Army to be so many several things or what you please, this is strange indeed, and if this is all, we need not fear; for to be every thing, or what you please, is to be nothing at all, I admire this Gentleman shou'd stumble on so odd a beginning; but to go on, *let him read first, the story of Matho and Spendius at Carthage; Secondly, the Histories of Strada and Bentivoglio; where he will find what work Nine Thousand Spaniards made in the 17 Provinces, tho'*
the

the Country was full of fortified Towns, possess'd. by the Low-Country Lords, and they had assistance from Germany, England and France. I think this one Paragraph is a direct Confutation of the whole Book; for if Nine Thousand Spaniards well Disciplin'd, made such havock in the 17 Provinces; tho' the Country was full of fortified Towns, and in the Possession of the Low-Country Lords, assisted too by Germany, England and France; I think we, (who can't boast of many strong fortified Towns, nor can't reasonably expect any quick Assistance from Abroad,) shou'd think of keeping up a Force able and sufficient to protect us in case of Necessity, and not of leaving our selves Open and Unguarded; this is so very obvious to the meanest degree of Sense, that I wonder how these Gentlemen or any one else can have a thought to the contrary.

But he goes on confuting his own Notions; for he confesses *that we have always had an Establish'd Force among us*, if so, then I think the dispute may be brought into a narrow Compass; for the question will not be, *if a Standing Force here is Legal*; for that's granted, but the question will be, *what Forces are Necessary to be kept in Pay at this time*; which may be immediately resolv'd, by considering what an Army is rais'd and kept in Pay for; and it is either to *Invade and Offend* our Enemies, or to be a *Security and Defence* to our selves, when we have reason to fear an Annoyance or Invasion from Abroad; and I suppose all *Englishmen* will see the occasion of a *Standing Force*, and a pretty large one too; for if

we have not an *Army sufficient for our Security and Preservation*, we had as good have none; so that all the pains this Gentleman has been at in computing the Forces now in Pay, on purpose to instill Fears and Jealousies in the hearts of his Majesty's good Subjects, is to no manner of purpose, unless it be to give us the greater reason to rejoyce in our Security, and to thank God that we are so well provided for our Defence. 'Tis true indeed we have just had a Peace; which gives these Gentlemen occasion to say, that we have nothing to fear, and consequently no Use for an Army, but if we consider how apt a certain Prince is to disturb and Invade his Neighbours, and how able he is at this time to do it; how often also he has found pretences to break the most Solemn Leagues, we shou'd quickly be convinc'd of the contrary, and find very good Grounds to fear an attempt upon us if we are not able to prevent it. In Page 3 he highly extolls the Merits of *Queen Elizabeth*, and deservedly too, he tells us, *She assisted the Dutch*, whereby She trained up her Subjects in the Art of War, *That She wou'd never permit them nor France to build any great Ships; kept the Keys of the Maes and Scheld in her own hands; and died with an uncontrol'd Dominion of the Seas, and Arbitress of Christendom; all this She did with a Revenue not exceeding 300000 l. per Annum, and had but inconsiderable Taxes from her People.*

To dispute with these Men, we must set things in a right Light. 'Tis plain, they built upon false suppositions, which few People observe, being dazled with

with the plausibleness of their Arguments, and blinded with their pretended concern for their Country; but to argue truly upon the matter, and to state the Case aright, we must consider the Alterations, and Revolutions, that have happen'd in *Europe*, within these hundred Years. *France* is now arriv'd to a vast Height, 'tis now no more that *France* which we could Invade and almost Conquer at our pleasure. We may indeed forbid them building great Ships, but I fancy they wou'd hardly mind us. Ships they have to compose a strong and mighty Fleet, with Seamen able and experienc'd to Man them, great Armies at Land in constant Pay; this is a State far differing from what they were formerly; therefore we go a wrong way to work, when we suppose them in the same condition they were in a hundred Years ago, and build *Maxims* for present use on those suppositions; for 'tis evident they are encreas'd to an incredible pitch in extent of their Country, Riches, and multitudes of the Inhabitants; that this is no groundless supposition, is very clear, by their being able to cope with a Confederacy of the most Potent Princes of *Europe* for ten Years together: As the Author of the account of *Denmark* says in his Preface, *we have lately bought the experience of this truth too dear not to be now sensible of it. 'Tis not very long ago since nothing was more generally believ'd (even by Men of the best Sense) than that the Power of England was so unquestionably establish'd at Sea, that no Force cou'd possibly shake it; that the English Valour and Manner of Fighting was so far beyond all others, that nothing was more desirable than a War with France. Shou'd any*

one have been so regardless of his reputation at that time to have represented the French an overmatch for the United Forces of England and Holland; or have said, that we shou'd live to see our selves insulted on our own Coasts, and our Trade endanger'd by them, that we shou'd be in apprehensions of an Invasion and a French Conquest, such a venturesome Man must have expected to have pass'd for a very Traveller, or at best, for an illnatur'd and unthinking Person, who little consider'd what the resistless Force of an English Arm was; but our late Experience has reclaim'd us from these Mistakes: Our Fathers and Grand-Fathers told us indeed these things, when they were true, when our Teomanry and Commonalty were every day Exercis'd in drawing the Long Bow, and handling the Brown Bill, with other Weapons then in use, wherein we excell'd all the World.

To set this still in a clearer Light, 'twill not be amiss if we consider the State of *England* in respect of what it was formerly; and I believe we may, without much thought, affirm that our Monarchy was at its highest pitch in the Reign of our glorious Queen *Elizabeth*, the remissness and carelessness of some of the late Reigns have soften'd our Spirits, and brought a Luxury unknown to our Fore-Fathers in vogue among us, whereby we are degenerated from that old hardiness and Fortitude, our Ancestors were so famous for. This being the true State of the Case without partiality on either side; these Gentlemens Notions will naturally fall to peices; and I hope that true Englishmen will no longer suffer themselves to be impos'd on by

a jingle of Words, that have only an empty sound to recommend them; 'tis time I think to look about us, and consider seriously on the matter, before we part with those Forces that have so bravely fought for us Abroad, and are still so willing and able to defend us at Home: but before I part with this Gentleman on this head, I can't but take notice of the fly Insinuation he makes of Queen Elizabeth's doing all those great things with only 300000 *l. per Annum*, and some inconsiderable Taxes besides; his design is that People shou'd immediately make reflections on the Taxes that have been rais'd to Maintain this War; but if this Gentleman had that Ingenuity he pretends to, he wou'd hinder such Reflections, by letting us know that such a Summ was more than 3 times as much in our Days, and that by her Privateers She took several Millions from the *Spaniards*, besides the Customs and Interest were paid her by the *Dutch*, with these She did all those great things: that She had but an Army between 1400 and 2000 Men in time of Peace is evidently false; for there were a greater Number than that requisite to the Garrisoning of the Cautionary Towns in her hands in *Flanders*; but I think 'tis needless to follow him in his Historical Account of things, for they are very little, to his purpose, or indeed to any purpose at all.

In Page 19 he tells us, *That his present Majesty was invited over, and landed at Torbay, publishing a Declaration, which set forth all the Oppressions of the late Reign, (but the keeping up a Standing Army) declar'd for a free Parliament, in which things*

were to be so settled, that there shou'd be no danger of falling again into Slavery ; and promis'd to send back all his foreign Forces as soon as this was done.

Sure these Gentlemen imagine they may say any thing ; they are great Instances of the Mildness of the present Government, when they are not brought to an Account, for taking such Liberties both in their Speeches and Writings, to Insinuate whatever they think may be prejudicial to those above them ; for to tell us that a *Standing Army* is certain Slavery, and to Insinuate that his present Majesty intended from the very first to maintain a *Standing Army*, is as plain as they can speak, to asperse His Majesty with what they daily experience to be false : such Liberties are too bold, and that they are not call'd to Account for them, is plain demonstration of the Idleness and Vanity of their Fears.

Here again he lays the blame of *Ireland's* not being timely succour'd on the Government, when we all know how earnest His Majesty was for the Relief of those distressed People ; tho' he tell us, that *Ireland* was neglected to be relieved, for a pretence for the raising a greater Army ; I wou'd have these Gentlemen take care how they provoke Mercy.

In Page 21, he tells us, *the King acquainted the Parliament the 8th of March, when speaking of the deplorable Condition of Ireland, that he thought it not adviseable to undertake the reducing of it, with less than 20000 Horse and Foot. This was a better Pill to the Parliament, who thought they might have managed their share*

share of the War with France by a Fleet at Sea, but there was no Remedy, a greater Army must be rais'd, or Ireland lost. This Gentleman writes first I suppose, and seldom minds his Sense. Did the Parliament think of Conquering *Ireland* by a Fleet? He would have had them landed their Seamen, and left our Ships a prey to the *French*. We'll forgive his blunder however, if he'll take care what he says hereafter : but I admire how this Gentleman makes the Conquest of *Ireland* and a War with *France* the same thing ; for I take them to be distinct : *Ireland* is our own Country, and when we fought for that, we fought for what was immediately our own, we were not at War with *France*, or any Foreign Prince, we were reducing a People, who were in actual Rebellion to the Crown of *England*, but we'll not quarrel about Terms ; tho' by the way, the miseries and hardships our Fellow Subjects of *Ireland* felt, shou'd make us terribly afraid of giving any Neighbouring Prince the least hopes of succeeding in any Attempt upon us ; for 'tis an undeniable Maxim, *that opportunity makes the Thief*, and by *Disbanding* our Troops, we may possibly give some grounds for hopes of Success to a Prince naturally Aspiring and Ambitious, and very apt to fancy himself capable of doing more than he is able ; but to return, I wou'd ask this Gentleman how he came to be so sure *that the Parliament thought to have managed their share of this War by a Fleet at Sea*, which he so positively asserts. We are all sure that the Parliaments of *England* were of another mind in former Days, or they wou'd never have contributed so largely and liberally towards an Invasion of *France* as they often did, Nay, in all our

Historics, I never found they ever parted with their Money more heartily, than when it was for a War with that Country, and yet they never so much as dream't of their carrying on a War, only by a Fleet at Sea, but quite the contrary; for we all of us know, that our Kings very frequently Transported great Armies over into *Flanders*, *Normandy*, or some part of *France*, thinking it more adviseable to Seat the War in an Enemies Country rather than their own. To give some Instances,

William the Conqueror enter'd *France* with a great Army. *William Rufus* Invaded *Normandy*, so did *Henry* the V. and *Richard* the I. *Henry* the III. twice Transported great Armies over to *France*. *Edward* the I. twice Invaded *France*. There were no less than five several Armies Transported over to *France* in the Reign of *Edward* the H. *Henry* the V. had continually an Army in *France*. Many more Instances might be given of the like nature, but these are enough to let us see, that in former times our Parliaments thought it no diminution to their Wisdom to carry on their Warrs in Foreign Parts by Land-Forces; tho' in those Days they were confessedly stronger at Sea than any of their Neighbours; and amongst all our Princes we find none more belov'd, and extoll'd, than those Martial Monarchs, who Transported and Headed their *English* Armies in Foreign Parts. Besides, whoever do's but consider how liberally and largely our late Parliaments have contributed towards the Expence of a ten Years War, and what a happy Agreement and Union there has been all along betwixt the King and them,

them, I say, whoever considers this, can by no means believe he speaks truth, when he tells us, *that the Parliament thought they might have manag'd their share of the War with France by a Fleet at Sea, and that they thought the raising a Land Force a bitter Pill.*

I think this Gentleman should be requir'd to give a more publick account of this Assertion. To make us believe the King out-witted the Parliament, and that the Parliament themselves acted disagreeably to their own opinions, this is a New contrivance, and may in time produce very evil Consequences. But I hope Men of Sense will take care how they are calld by such horrid Insinuations.

Well, now he comes to his dear beloved Militia, and tells us what wonders were done in *Ireland* by the *Iniskilling-Men*, and those of *Londonderry*; but pray let us stop a little to consider the matter, and not suffer this Phamphleteer to run away with Noise and Nonsense. The *Iniskilling Men* were People made desperate by the Ruins of their Estates and Fortunes, almost weary of their Lives by the Cruelties and Hardships they suffer'd from the *Irish Papists*, having the cries of their Wives and Children, (labouring under the greatest Miseries) ever in their Ears, and the deplorable condition of their *Native Country* before their Eyes; beside they were not a *Militia*, as our Author falsely boasts, but were for the most part Gentlemen and others that fled from the Barbarities of the *Irish Papists* from all parts of *Ireland*, and gather'd in a Body for their security at *Iniskilling*, and great Numbers of them Officers and private Soldiers

of

of the Army, whom *Tryconnel* had Disbanded because Protestants, Men that had been in Pay and Discipline a great part of the Reign of King *Chales* the II. So that 'tis a mistake to say they were a *Militia*; farther, if it be consider'd whom they fought with, there's none will wonder at what they did, they encountred poor senseless wretches that knew not their Right hands from their Left; and always look behind them when they draw their Swords. And if these are the Wonders they boast of, they had as good be silent, and say nothing of the matter.

In the next Page he says, *at last by our great Armies and Fleets, and the constant Expence of maintaining them, we were too hard for the OEconomy, Skill, and Policy of France, and notwithstanding all our difficulties, brought them to terms both Safe and Honourable.* Did we so *Sir.* then I think we have very little reason to complain, and if our *Fleet and Armies* procur'd us this Peace, They only can preserve it; by parting with *either* we make it precarious, and to depend meerly on the *Generosity* of an Enemy, who is not us'd to be firmer to his Word than his Interest; several true sensible *Englishmen* are of the opinion, that the longer we maintain a *Standing Armed Force*, we shall be the longer from having Occasion to make use of them; but that on the contrary, the sooner we *Disband* them, the sooner we shall be put to the trouble and charge of raising New; For 'tis certainly true, that that Nation which is most *able* to wage War, will be the unlikeliest to be put to the trouble of it.

But

But here he says, *I shall omit giving any account of the Conduct of our Fleet during this War, how few Advantages we reap'd by it, and how many occasions was lost of Destroying the French; only thus much I will Observe, that tho' a great part of it may be attributed to the Negligence, Ignorance, or Treachery of Inferior Officers, yet it cou'd not universally happen (the Gentleman is positive in what he says) and unpunish'd too, notwithstanding the Clamours of the Merchants, and repeated complaints in Parliament, unless the Cause had laid deeper.* Now this Gentleman shou'd take care to be well inform'd, before he so positively Asserts things of this Nature; he may be call'd on to give an Account of his knowledge in the Affairs he pretends to be so well acquainted with, and it may go very hard with him if he can't prove what he Asserts, and produce Grounds for his malicious Insinuations; but if he is inform'd of the Nature of Affairs, and so well knows the miscarriages that have befall us, where the Source and Original of them lay, their secret Springs and Movements; he ought, especially since he pretends to be such a *Patriot*, to have pointed out the Persons, discover'd the Authors, and openly accus'd them to the World; for *God* be thanked, none need be silent now in a just Cause, none need be afraid or backward to reveal the Truth; we are unacquainted with *Threats* and *Closettings* so frequent in the *late Reigns*, and are neither Brib'd nor terrified out of the Truth; if they are only his own private Suggestions, and *Chimera's* rais'd and somented by his own ill Humors, he ought to have forbore them, particularly at this time of Day, when they may embroil the King and Parliament into Heats and Jealousies of each

each other, which might create greater hardships to the Nation, than the whole ten Years War, and might prove more fatal in the end.

However, to satisfy these murmuring Gentlemen in this point, we may give very good reasons that our Affairs at Sea were not manag'd to more advantage, and also that they are not capable of being better manag'd without our having a *Land Force* at home; for the *French King* found his Account lay in *Pyrating* on our Merchants, where something was to be had, rather than in Fighting our Fleets, where, besides the Uncertainty of Victory, nothing but dry Blows were to be gain'd; whereas, by taking our Trading Vessels, he not only impoverish'd us, but at the same time enrich'd himself, which was a double advantage; and to hinder this Misfortune there was no way but one, that was the dividing our Fleet, as he did his, into several small Squadrons, and send them Cruising, and Coasting about in all places where our Merchants had any business; but then the Remedy wou'd have been worse than the Disease; for we shou'd have left ourselves *Open* and *Unguarded*, at a time when our King was out of the Nation, and all our Forces in *Flanders*; and I believe the *French* wou'd scarce have let slip'd the opportunity of Invading us, and hardly fail'd of making their Advantage of such an Over-sight. This I think is enough to convince these *Purblind Politicians* of the *Necessity* of a *Standing Army*; for if a War shou'd break out again, having a *Land Force* to secure us, our Fleet may divide themselves, and either block our Enemies in their own Ports, or attend and Convoy
our

our Merchants in all places of Danger, so hinder our Enemies from Enriching themselves by our Losses; Whereas, if we are without a *Land Force* sufficient to Protect us, our *Naval Forces* cou'd take little care of our Merchants (whereby they wou'd every where, become an easie Prey to the Enemies Privateers) for they must keep together in a Body at home, to be able to secure us from Invasions, lest our Enemies shou'd come upon us; so while we were Protecting our Trade, we might lose the Kingdom.

Now he comes to his Computations, which as I said, signifie nothing to the purpose, unless it be to make us rejoyce that we are in so good a Condition to resist our *Enemies Abroad*, for I know of none we have at home; if he knows of any, let him speak out, which I suppose is more than he is willing to do: 'Tis generally observ'd of such as make the greatest Noise and Stir, that they are always the readiest to pull in their Horns, and cry they know nothing of the matter. Besides when he was computing, 'twou'd have been but a little more trouble to have inform'd us the Number of the *French Forces*, and what Troops the *Dutch* and other Nations have in Pay, this wou'd have been very convenient, we might have known the *Strength* of our *Neighbours* as well as our selves, and then perhaps thought it might be prudent to keep it up in some tolerable degree of equality with theirs; this I am persuaded would be the natural result of our reflecting on their great Strength.

If indeed this Gentleman, or any of his Adherents, cou'd actually engage our *Neighbours* to *Disband their Forces*, we shou'd no longer dispute this point with him,

but I suppose this is more than he will promise; therefore since all around us are in Arms, and entertain *vast Numbers of Armed Troops* in constant Pay, 'twou'd be a fatal blot in our Politicks to part with ours; for, *since the Practice is grown so general, No King or Prince, tho' endowed with never so peaceable a Spirit, and never so desirous of being at ease, dares lead the Dance and disarm, for fear of his Armed Neighbours, whose Necessities or Ambition make them wait only for an opportunity to fall upon him that is worst provided to make resistance.* So that while our Neighbours keep up their *Standing Forces*, 'tis evident we must do so, unless we will submit our selves to be Insulted by them.

Farther, when this Gentleman tells us the greatness of our *Standing Forces* now, and that in former Days they were very inconsiderable, he only lets us know just as much as will serve his own turn and no more, for there's a vast alteration crept into the very Constitution of our Government within these hundred and fifty Years; formerly the Nobility and Gentry held their Possessions and Lands from the Crown by *Knight's Service*, and so were always bound to attend on their Kings in his Wars with certain Numbers of Armed Men, according to the Tenure and Extent of their several Lordships or Lands, and they had their *Villains or Vassals*, who, by a like Tenure from them, were oblig'd to wait on their respective Lords or Landlords, when requir'd for the Service of their King and Country, and that they might not be Undisciplin'd when they were call'd for, every Parish was to take care that all Boys shou'd at set times Exercise the Arms then in Use, as Shooting in Bows, handling the Battle Ax, and such like; so that by this Method there was no occasion for any great
Standing

Standing Force, for the People were Soldiers themselves, and might be rais'd on any sudden Occasion, by the Kings giving Notice to the Nobility and Gentry of his want of their Service, and by their immediate Summoning their *Vassals* for the Attendance they were bound to pay. 'Twill be immediately reply'd why may it not be so now, by this means we might rid our selves of the fears of a *Standing Army*, and yet be able to defend our selves, or Annoy our Enemy. To this I answer, I shou'd be very glad if some such Method cou'd be taken now, and a *Militia* formed capable of managing their share of War, and supporting our Credit and Reputation Abroad in the World, without our being put to the Uneasiness and Expence of a *Standing Force*, for I am not so rash as to affirm a *Standing Army* to be at all a *Benefit* or *Advantage* to the Nation, if it might be dispens'd with on good Terms, no, rather quite the contrary, I think the only Reason, that can be giving for the keeping a *Standing Force* in Pay, is *Necessity*: But I hardly think a *Militia* can be form'd to serve our occasions now. For,

First, by the cunning and contrivance of Humane reach and Invention, and the change of Times and Accidents, War now is become a Trade, it consists not so much in strength of Body, or a real Courage, as in Slight and Witt; to be able to fortifie Camps and Towns, to draw your Enemy into Ambuscades, or drill him along into disadvantageous Places, to be able to draw him to Battle, or secure your self from being fore'd to one, these are now the best Martial Qualifications, and these are things must be learnt by *Use* and *Practice*, none can be perfect in them but by *Experience*, there must be an *Apprenticeship* serv'd for the learning them.

This I think is sufficient, to make us believe that a *Militia* can very hardly be so regulated, as to prove useful at this time of Day.

2dly, Supposing a *Militia* might be brought to good Discipline and Order, yet 'twou'd be a very great while before such a thing cou'd be done, and wou'd these inconsiderate Gentlemen have us leave our selves *Naked* and *Open* all the time, this wou'd be an Imprudence that our Enemies perhaps wou'd be glad to find us guilty of, since I believe they only wou'd be the gainers by it.

3dly, Tho' our *Militia* was serviceable, yet we shou'd find very few of them forward to go over to any Foreign Parts, where it might be convenient and necessary for us to employ our Forces, for they wou'd be Men that were settled and fixt by Wives and Families at home, whereas our *Standing Forces* (the Private Soldiers) are most of them Men that have no fixt Habitations are not ty'd at home by Wives and Families, but taken either young before they had settled themselves, or mostly from among those that were Vagabonds, and Wanderers, that had no business, and were rather a Burthen than Benefit to their Country, but by being put into the Army are now become useful and beneficial to it; whereas if they are Disbanded, what can be expected from such people, who are not fixt at home by the tye of Families or Interest, but to go abroad, and enter into any Service that will be so kind as to entertain them; and who can blame them, since they know no other way of Livelihood; the Consequenc of which thing alone might fright us from what these Gentlemen wou'd have us immediately do, and make us very cautious how we part from that Force, which have done

us so much good even when they were but learning their Trade, which at our Cost and Expences they have learnt so well as to be Masters of ; but by Disbanding them, and turning them abroad, we give our Neighbours the opportunity of reaping the Profit and Advantage.

But this Gentleman tells us *we need not send Forces into Foreign Parts, we need only have a strong Fleet at Sea, and that wou'd be security enough* : But I think the Practice of all our Kings and Parliaments, as I have already Instanc'd, may be enough to confute one part of this Assertion ; for I take it, our Forefathers were as wise and knowing in what concern'd their Interest, as any of us now can pretend to ; and if we loak back into former Stories we shall find enough to convince us of the folly of trusting too much to the other part ; by seeing what has happen'd, we shall quickly find that a Fleet will not secure us from Invasions. To give some Instances to these Positive Gentlemen, How often did the *Danes* land great Numbers of Armed Forces, in almost every part of this Island : continually alarming the poor People, ruining and making horrible devastations wherever they came ; exercising all manner of Barbarities on the poor unprovided *English*, putting whole Towns, Men, Women and Children to the Sword ; till at last they Lorded it over the whole Island ; and perhaps there are a People in the World, wou'd not be much civiller on an occasion, which God forbid they shou'd ever have ; and which while we have a good Army, we need not fear ; but to give some more Instances. *William* the Conqueror landed with an Army here, so did his Son *Robert*, Duke of *Normandy*, in the Reign of *William Rufus*, and in the Reign of *Henry* the First. The
Empress

Empress *Maud* landed an Army in the Reign of King *Stephen*, so did *Henry II.* The *French* Invaded the Land in the Reign of *Henry III.* Queen *Isabel* landed with an Army at *Orwel*, in *Suffex*, in the Reign of *Edward* the Second. *Henry* the Seventh landed with an Army, tho' *Richard* the Third took all possible care to hinder him. And whenever there have been heats and discontents in this Kingdom, the *French* have ever assisted one or another party to keep up the Contention; tho' our Princes by their Fleets have always endeavour'd to hinder it. These are enough to convince every lover of his Country, of the falsity of these Gentlemen's, saying that a Fleet only is able to protect us.

Perhaps they will object against what has been said, and say, That in those days we were weak at Sea, but that now we are grown much stronger. So is our Neighbours too, as we very well know by experience; I scarce think any of these angry Gentlemen will venture to affirm, that we are at this time, the most potent at Sea, or that none of our Neighbours dare to look us in the face on that Element; whereas in former days, tho' we were but mean at Sea, in comparison of what we are now; yet our Neighbours were much meaner, we were formerly confessedly the most powerful in Shipping, and enjoyed an absolute and uncontrou'd dominion on the Seas; and if in those days, when we bore so great a sway on the Ocean, and all the Nations around us so little, a Fleet cou'd not hinder Armies from landing in *England*; I can't think how it shou'd do it now, when our Neighbours are as strong in Shipping, and as Powerful at Sea as our Selves. This I think is a plain case, an Argument so clear, that I wonder how any sensible persons can overlook it. And if we may be Invaded, tho'

we have a good Fleet, as 'tis plain we may, we shou'd be careful how we parted with a Land Force; which wou'd then be our only safety, and can be no Injury at all to us, as long as his Majesty is so clearly in the Interest of his People.

All this great Clamour and Noife against a *Standing Army*, can have no other meaning than this, That they dare not trust his Majesty, or rely on his Integrity; these are hard things, and a very ungrateful way of dealing with a Prince, who has all his Life-time hazarded his Person for the relief and succour of the Distressed; who cou'd never be wrought upon, either by bribes or menaces, to be unjust to his word, even in the smallest particle; a Prince whose single Reputation caused a strict band and Union amongst Princes of the most disagreeing Interests, Humours, and Religions. That this Prince shou'd be mistrusted by a People of the *same Religion*, is a thing wonderful and surprizing; and will hardly be credited in after Ages, especially when they shall know that he *rescued these same People from the Faws of Slavery and Popery*; and sav'd them just sinking into the Pit of Destruction; but this is more than these Gentlemen dare openly own; therefore they complain against the *Court*, and the *Government*; concealing their base Reflections and ill-manner'd Insinuations, under double and ambiguous meanings; but the skreen is too thin and transparent; 'tis easily seen through, and their thoughts as readily apprehended as if they had writ them at length.

But to go on with this Gentleman, and come to his *Crisis*, Page 42, where he says, *several Accidents concur to make the Disbanding of an Army practicable which may not happen again.* To be even with him, and give him

him a *Rowland* for his *Oliver*; several Accidents concur to oblige us to keep up a *Standing Army* here, which never did happen, nor never may again: There's a King beyond Sea, who maintains pretensions to the Crown, with a Prince whom he owns to be his Lawful Son and Heir; so young that he may live according to an indifferent Computation these 40 Years or more, and tho' they may seem quiet and dormant for a time, yet 'tis hardly to be expected they will let slip any opportunity, they may think favourable to the regaining their pretended Rights; 'tis to be consider'd also, that they are of a Religion which no Oaths can bind or secure, when their Church will be a gainer by the Breach of them; add to this, that this Nation has been always the bar and hindrance to all the ambitious designs and Projects of that Communion, and this has created an incurable hatred in them towards us, which they never fail to let us know upon all occasions; so that we have all the reason in the World to look about us, especially, considering there are such Multitudes against us, and so few to assist us; 'tis true we have just made a Peace, after a chargeable and Expensive War; but as 'twas the *Number and Valour of our Troops* that forc't it from an Ambitious and inveterate Enemy; so nothing but the *same* can preserve it to us; for we are all pretty confident, that he whom we have had to deal with, has not been tender in breaking the most solemn Leagues, when either his Interest or Ambition has thought it convenient.

Besides we see he has not deliver'd *Brisack* to the Emperour; which he ought to have done, but finds pretences to delay it till Spring, and we know not whether he'll do it then or no, unless he finds he shall be forc't to it. Add to these, the great Number of *Jacobites* we have at home,

Who,

who are a People restless and uneasie; ready to Plot and execute any base and Villainous designs: Add also, that the King of *Spain* lies a dying, and the King of *France* has great Armies ready to enter into that Country; at so favourable a Juncture, to support the right he pretends to that Crown; I say, all these things truly consider'd, *Here's a concurrence of Circumstances that never happen'd at once till now, nor perhaps never may again, that call upon us, and oblige us to keep up our Standing Forces at this Time.*

I think I have said enough to convince any reasonable Persons of the Necessity of an Army at this time; which is all need be done, to answer this *Historian*; for if there is a necessity of an Army, 'tis certain it shou'd be one that may be sufficient and able to cope with any force our Enemies may bring against us; or else we had as good have none at all: In former times when our Neighbours had but *five or ten thousand Men* in Arms there was no occasion for our having a greater Number; but if they encrease to a Hundred thousand or more, we must also be in some tolerable degree equal with them, or be contented to be Insulted or Invaded by those that are stronger; this is so very plain and clear, I shall argue it no farther, but shew the danger of trusting to a *Militia*, when they are attack'd by regular and disciplin'd Troops and so conclude,

And the *Want* of a sufficient Number of Standing and Disciplin'd Troops may be learnt from the *Dutch*, who were almost brought to the brink of ruin, in the Year 1672, when the *French*, who seldom fail to make their advantages of the over-sites and Neglects of their Neighbours; Invaded them with mighty Armies, which

E. like

like a Torrent over-run Three large Provinces, taking above Forty strong Towns in almost as many days. Whoever reads Sir *William Temple's* Observations, will find that Great Man makes out the want of regular Standing Forces, one of the chief reasons of their Misfortunes, which had like to have been the utter Ruin of their Commonwealth; he says, *it was their too great parsimony in disbanding the best of their Foreign Officers and Troops, after the Peace of Munster; he tells us, those Ministers who had the Directions of Affairs, bent their Chief application to the Strength and Order of their Fleet, and totally Neglected their Land Army; so that those few Souldiers they had were without Discipline. These were the Reasons made the French King suppose their Conquest Easie, and invited him to invade them, and upon Tryal he found he was not mistaken, for they were not able to resist him; tho' 'tis Observable that for Twenty Years before, they had been regulating their Militia, and endeavouring to make it serviceable, but 'twas so far from being so, that they suffer'd the French to become Masters of their strong Fortified Towns almost as soon as they approach'd them, this is so lively and near an Example and so well fitted for our Instruction, that methinks we shou'd take warning by it, without desiring to make the Experiment our selves.*

Felix quem faciunt aliena pericula Cantum.

How often has *Poland*, (a Country these Gentlemen are pleas'd to produce as an Instance of supporting themselves by a *Militia*) been ravag'd and Insulted by the *Sweeds, Muscovites, and Tartars*, and suffer'd all the Extremities of Fire and Sword for the want of *Standing and Regular Troops*.

New

Now I think I have sufficiently shew'd the weakness of these Gentlemen's Arguments, and the *absolute Necessity* for our keeping up a *Land Force*, not by *false Computations* of things, but by a true consideration of the present Circumstances of Affairs, which is the only means to find the right of this Matter; So that I hope no true *Englishman*, who desires the good of his Country, will be for the *Disbanding the Forces* till either our Neighbours have done the same, or that our *Militia* be so well regulated, that they may be able to Cope with any *Disciplin'd Troops* whatsoever.

For supposing, on our *Immediate Disbanding our Forces* any of our Neighbours shou'd think it the Critical time to attempt an Invasion of *England*, before our *Militia* was ready to receive them, and this is none of the unlikeliest Suppositions, wou'd ask these Gentlemen, if we shou'd not have some Reasons for apprehending of of danger, when we have only the Success of a Fleet to depend on, several Accidents might happen to render it unserviceable to us, as our being kept in Port by contrary Winds, or our not being in a readiness enough to hinder them, these are no very Improbable things, we have had the knowledge of their Possibility by Experience, and I say, imagining it happen'd that we were Invaded, I desire to know what resistance our *Militia* cou'd make against 20 or 30 *Thousand Regular Troops* well Disciplin'd and iour'd the War; we shou'd then *wish* for our *Forces* when they were not to be had, nay perhaps when a considerable Number of them were list'd in the Enemies Service, having been so ungratefully us'd here as to be turn'd loose to Want and Misery, after having spent their Youth and Blood in our Service; and what Nation wou'd pity us? Wou'd not all the
World

World cry out we deservedly fell Martyrs of our Folly? that we could blame none but our selves, for that our selves only were the Authors of our Destruction.

After all that can be said on both sides, and to suppose even all the Idle Chimeras these *Grumbletonians* wou'd fright us with, the whole matter absolutely depends on our choosing one of these two things, viz. *either to trust King William or King Lewis.*

F I N I S.

